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Abstract	  
Which of praxis or theoria should be primary? Traditionally, theoria, the 
contemplative gaining of knowledge and love of God, came first. Liberation 
theologians have insisted instead that theology must be rooted in praxis in order to 
achieve social change that is an irruption of the Kingdom of God into history. To 
them, understanding of neighbor and of God follows from reflection on political and 
social action. This essay explores the question of which alternative is primary based 
on the mature theology of St Thomas Aquinas as found in the Summa Theologica. 
For Aquinas, the final end of humanity is happiness that is found in unity with the 
Triune God. But increasing conformity of the imago Dei within one necessitates that 
growing wisdom and love (charity) break out as action in the world, just as the Word 
and Spirit were sent into the world to make this final end possible for fallen 
humanity. Charity is not limited to almsgiving but is rather a mode of life involving 
gaining a thorough knowledge of the true needs of one’s neighbor and acting on this 
knowledge with wisdom to build a just peace among all in society. Even the spheres 
of business and economics are places of training in the practice of seeing that one’s 
neighbors have their needs met through just means. The justice required by charity 
can demand the re-ordering of economic affairs. The Christian life is a mode of life 
(1) oriented toward knowledge and union with God (theoria) but that very 
orientation requires that one have (2) knowledge and union with neighbor, which (3) 
necessarily involves praxis with the poor. For Aquinas, theoria is logically primary. 
However, motion toward unity with God means increasing unity of theoria and 
praxis.   
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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
Which of praxis or theoria should be primary in theology, or equivalently, in the 
Christian life that is being reflected upon? Here, by praxis I mean actions that are 
aimed at some good.1 By theoria I mean both an apprehension of the truth by the 
intellect and knowledge that comes through experience of love, in Latin 
“contemplatio”. (I will use “theoria” and “praxis” rather than the English words 
“theory” and “practice” to avoid confusion with the tension that is present in almost 
all fields of endeavor between (1) academic teaching and theorizing and (2) the 
practices of day-to-day work.) The use of “theoria” in this combined sense in the 
Christian tradition dates back to Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Gregory of 
Nyssa.2 From the fourth century through to the twentieth the primacy of theoria 
appeared to be the orthodox position. That is, right belief meant the intellectual 
assent to right positions primarily regarding God, that portion of theoria more easily 
reducible to formulas. 
The idea that praxis should be prior to theoria in philosophy owes much to Karl 
Marx: 
The question of whether human thinking can reach objective truth—is 
not a question of theory but a practical question. … The coincidence of 
change of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can only 
be comprehended and rationally understood as revolutionary practice. … 
All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to 
mysticism find their rational solution in human practice. … The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world. The point is to change it.3  
The term “praxis” came into use as describing a necessary connection between 
theology and politics with the political theology of the German Johann Baptist Metz 
in the 1960’s.4 Metz’s work was a response to the challenges to the churches of the 
                                                
1 Richard Parry, “Episteme and Techne”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available at: 
2 Thomas Keating, Open Mind, Open Heart: The Contemplative Dimension of the Gospel, (London: 
Continuum, 2002), pp. 19-20. 
3 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach”, in Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (eds. and trans.), 
Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967), 
pp. 400-402. Italics in the original. 
4 Hugo Assman, Teología desde la Praxis de la Liberación, (Salamanca: Edición Sígueme, 1973), p. 
16.  
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Holocaust and the rapid secularization of society in the Bundesrepublik.5 To Metz, 
praxis in theology meant ensuring that theology is grounded in history—in events 
and social situations of past, present, and future—to ensure that it is not captive to 
the present, greedy interests of the upper and middle classes and the resulting 
pressure toward individualism. Part of this grounding is Marxist in nature, namely an 
awareness of the structures of power and interest that influence what is held to be 
knowledge.6 Metz proposed to reflect along the theoria-praxis axis in new terms.7 
“Such a political theology desacralizes not only nature, but also the institutions of 
the status quo.” 8 “Metz emphasized that God in the Bible is the ultimate reference of 
the sense of human experience at the socio-political level, and not at the level of 
private interiorization.”9 
The idea that praxis should be primary in Christian theology was introduced, at least 
to the English-speaking world, by Gustavo Gutiérrez’s classic Theology of 
Liberation.10 Here, I summarize Hugo Assman’s more extensive presentation from 
his book devoted to the topic, Teología desde la Praxis de la Liberación. Assman 
writes that theology needs new language because the traditional theological 
languages have become empty. That is, it seeks to establish the truth within itself, 
without an intrinsic connection to praxis. Existing theological language has as its 
ultimate concern eternity, God, and the salvation of the soul and its relation to the 
world is tangential. “The concept of theoria is precisely that which must be revised.” 
11 It encourages perspectives that are private, circumscribed by the tiny personal and 
interpersonal world. We must either abandon that concept or abandon Matthew 25 
and 1 John.12 Praxis defines truth: “The truth is the name given by the historical 
community to those historical acts that were, are, and shall be effective for the 
liberation of humanity.”13 Theological reflection on praxis is primarily to be done 
                                                
5 Rebecca S. Chopp, The Praxis of Suffering: An Interpretation of Liberation and Political 
Theologies, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1986), pp. 20-1. 
6 Assman, p. 17. Chopp, pp. 66-71. 
7 Assman, p. 17. 
8 Assman, p. 19. Translations from Spanish not attributed otherwise are those of this essay’s author. 
9 Assman, p. 21. 
10 Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, trans. by Caridad Inda and John Eagleston, 
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1973), pp. 6-12. 
11 Assman, pp. 62-63. 
12 Assman, p. 70. 
13 Assman, p. 65. 
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through a recovery of the theology of the cross, “focalizing centrally on the radical 
praxis expressed in the death of Christ, which shall constitute a permanence of 
criticism indispensable to the liberation struggle,”14 to be a “theology of 
revolution”.15 
Liberation theology adopts the concept of praxis within a hermeneutical cycle as its 
methodological keystone. The praxis is to be directly involved in the lives of the 
poor, participating with them in their struggle for liberation. Marxist social theory is 
then applied to analyze the structural causes of their poverty, reflecting on these 
structures in the light of scripture and sacred tradition, yielding insights leading to 
new theology and to decisions concerning actions to take toward a restructuring of 
society.16 Observing the results in the lives of the poor allows the hermeneutic cycle 
to be repeated.17  Note that here perceptions of the social situation obtained through 
praxis comes before Biblical exegesis or consultation of the theological tradition to 
obtain knowledge of God or man (theoria). To liberation theologians, scriptural 
hermeneutic can not be founded on scripture (in a non-vicious cycle) or sacred 
tradition. Rather scripture must be interpreted in the light of the present plight of the 
powerless. 
John Milbank argues that Liberation Theology’s acceptance and promotion of the 
secular social philosophies of Marxism,18 including the primacy of praxis, 
“naturalizes the supernatural”19 in order that the holy approach re-integration with 
the secular on the terms of Enlightenment reason.20  Furthermore, for Milbank, these 
secular political philosophies are themselves distorted developments from Christian 
theology and Biblical hermeneutics,21 in turn rooted in the late Medieval acceptance 
that God “exists” in the same sense that creatures exist.22 The power of the modern 
                                                
14 Assman, p. 76. 
15 Assman, p. 77. 
16 Gutierrez, p. 6-12. 
17 Thomas L. Schubeck, Liberation Ethics: Models, Sources, Norms, (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Fortress, 1993), pp. 136-140. 
18 James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology, (Milton 
Keynes: Paternoster Press, 2004), p. 45. 
19 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 207, 234-237. 
20 Milbank, p. 207. 
21 Milbank, pp. 12-23. 
22 Milbank, p. 302. 
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state, its violence, and its role as the promoter and protector of globalized capitalism 
is supported by these same distorted theological developments. Milbank teaches that 
this situation can only be countered by a return to theology as the one social science, 
where the Christian meta-narrative defines “reason” and the church becomes the 
definer, practitioner, and teacher of social harmony without reference to the state.23 
In other words, Milbank argues that the primacy of theoria over praxis results in a 
truer and less violence-promoting social theory than that of liberation theology.  
For Daniel Bell, the efforts of Liberation Theology to integrate Christianity with 
liberation from the capitalist social order fail because Liberation Theology provides 
a road from Christian exhortations to love to the world beyond where real action 
takes place.24 To correct the perversions of desire which capitalism both depends 
upon and fosters25 there must instead be an ecclesiology where the fellowship of the 
saints is the primary political community, one where the private values and desires 
fostered by global capitalism are challenged by the Church as it engages in concrete 
acts of charity and sharing that transgress the boundaries established by state and 
city.26 Rather than to pursue liberation through political and revolutionary action, 
Bell asks the poor to “refuse to cease suffering”: to continue to suffer oppression, 
pain, and death, showing forgiveness and relying on the God who ultimately will 
restore a just state of affairs.27 
Liberation Theologians and their supporters in the North American academy have 
provided a number of counter-critiques of the Radical Orthodox sensitivity promoted 
by Milbank and Bell. Doak argues that Milbank’s vision of theology, as the mother 
of all social science and its practices as being the pattern of society, is an 
unacceptable limitation on human freedom and diversity.28 For Doak, to achieve 
Milbank’s vision (which she criticizes as itself being an Utopian program) would 
ultimately require the state to use coercive measures to ensure that social functions 
could be carried out by the church in accordance with the Christian meta-narrative. 
                                                
23 Milbank, ch. 12. 
24 Daniel Bell, Liberation Theology after the End of History, (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 70-73. 
25 Bell, p. 12. 
26 Bell, p. 72. 
27 Bell, pp. 193-195. 
28 Mary Doak, “The Politics of Radical Orthodoxy: A Catholic Critique”, Theological Studies, vol. 68, 
no. 2, June 2007, pp. 368-393. 
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The result would not be the abjuration of violence foreseen by Milbank but rather a 
uniformity of belief, religious practice, and personal and community behavior 
enforced by a hybridized church and state. (Similarly but more precisely, Scott 
observes that Milbank requires that those who would participate in the life of the 
polis accept the orthodox Christian narrative.29) Doak answers Bell by asserting that 
far from being communities that demonstrate a life of sharing and that are active in 
identifying and opposing abuses of capitalism and state power, “many of our 
churches have been colonized by capitalist values”.30 
The idea that the Radical Orthodox critique of Liberation Theology fails in its 
response to colonialism lies at the heart of the defense of Liberation Theology of 
Maldanado-Torres.31 He sees Radical Orthodoxy as an attempted re-imposition not 
merely of theological orthodoxy but also of “border thinking”: the re-building of 
boundaries between white and brown and black, colonizer and colonized, male and 
female, oppressor and oppressed. This re-imposition and re-building follows the 
pattern of the colonizers of Latin America who created political boundaries and 
introduced African slaves, racial preference for whites, and European-Native 
American-mestizo-African racial tension to the Americas. Maldanado-Torres posits 
that what is needed is not Radical Orthodoxy but a “Radical Diversality”32 fully 
incorporating theology done from a multitude of post-colonial points of view, 
including mujerist and black theologies of liberation.  
Ivan Petrella offers two defenses of Liberation Theology to the Radical Orthodox 
critique.33 First, he says that the Radical Orthodox criticism reduces to the critique of 
idolatry. For Petrella, this critique fails because the critics cannot devise an 
alternative to the idol that still relieves the suffering of the poor.34 Second, he writes 
                                                
29 Peter Scott, “‘Global Capitalism’ vs. ‘End of Socialism’: Crux Theologicae? Engaging Liberation 
Theology and Theological Postliberalism”, Political Theology, vol. 2, no. 4, May 2001, pp. 36-54. 
30Doak, p. 383. 
31 Nelson Maldanado-Torres, “Liberation Theology and the Search for the Lost Paradigm” in Ivan 
Petrella (ed.), Latin American Liberation Theology: The Next Generation, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2005), 
pp. 39-61. 
32 Maldanado-Torres, p. 54. 
33 Ivan Petrella, The Future of Liberation Theology: An Argument and Manifesto, (London: SCM, 
2006), pp. 24-40. 
34 Petrella, The Future of Liberation Theology, p. 32. 
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that the critics “forget that life is prior to peace”,35 that is, that those who are 
impoverished to the point of death cannot participate in the church envisioned by 
Bell or the ecclesial society or state envisioned by Milbank. Without life there is no 
theology. Without liberation the poor are dead. Action is required to preserve life in 
the face of oppression. The Radical Orthodox critics do not offer meaningful action. 
Graham Ward has a response to such counter-critiques of Radical Orthodoxy from 
Liberation Theology.36 The requirement for immediate outcomes, which would 
include immediate liberation, partakes in the modern desire to forget death.37  
Nevertheless, the church should act to stop slavery in its current forms and prevent 
new forms from arising.38 But such a Christian act is different from the action of a 
revolutionary. The Christian act and that of the revolutionary differ in agency. 
Christian action is done as an agent of Christ, “to whom all hearts are open and from 
whom no secrets are hid”—who knows all things and futures—rather than in a 
delusion of self-sufficiency.39 The Christian act is done in imitation of Christ and can 
be parsed through an understanding of the life of Jesus,40 especially that life’s 
kenotic beginning and ending. Humans cannot penetrate the complexity of the 
interrelationships between all actions and effects in the world. But Christian action, 
because Christian action “participates in the actions of God”41 will be retained and 
not undone come the eschaton.42 
This conversation between those of the Radical Orthodoxy tendency and those of 
Liberation Theology is made from presuppositions that differ largely on the question 
of the primacy of theoria or praxis. Milbank gives priority to the Christian meta-
narrative (theoria) and finds the primacy of praxis analyzed through social theory to 
be the source of the extreme violence of late modernity. Bell places theoria rooted in 
ecclesiology and the Christian understanding of kenosis and the suffering of the poor 
ahead of revolutionary praxis. Maldanado-Torres, Doak, Scott, and Petrella reply 
                                                
35 Petrella, The Future of Liberation Theology, p. 128. 
36 Graham Ward, The Politics of Discipleship, (London: SCM, 2009). 
37 Ward, p. 214. 
38 Ward, p. 220. 
39 Ward, p. 184. 
40 Ward, p. 186. 
41 Ward, p. 193. 
42 Ward, p. 193. 
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that the Radical Orthodox positions are not acceptable because they do not in 
practice result in liberation of the poor, women, persons of color, and other 
oppressed groups. Ward’s response to the liberation theologians is that the theoria of 
participation in Christ renders actions more perfect and eternal than those rooted in 
the political praxis seeking immediate results. 
Recently, Ivan Petrella noted that the nearly forty years of Liberation Theology have 
had little practical effect. Its writers have broken into Latin American, Mujer-ist, 
African American, Feminist, African American Feminist and other sub-, and sub-
sub-groups. They have been successful in moving into the academy, but have had 
little influence on affairs beyond. Liberation Theology has failed its own test of 
praxis: liberating the oppressed.43 Petrella suggests that the problem is that 
Liberation Theology is still entangled with theology. He suggests that theologians of 
liberation work solely in fields of praxis. They may wish to leave the academy and 
re-train as social workers, nurses, or community organizers.44 It would seem that the 
practical result of giving praxis priority over theoria is that both theoria and also 
theology disappear. 
In this essay I propose to take a telic perspective based on the theology of Thomas 
Aquinas from which to view the question of the primacy of theoria or praxis, that is, 
to start from the telos (that is, the final end, last end, or purpose) of human beings. 
Why Aquinas? The assertion that praxis should be primary is a statement about the 
source of truth, namely that it is found in action with and for the poor. The general 
Christian approach concerning access to truth has been that it is to be found in 
scripture and sacred tradition and understood and applied to particular questions and 
circumstances through reason. Aquinas stands at the historical center of the 
development of that approach. He used or responded to the work of a vast array of 
previous Christian and pagan thinkers from both the Greek and Latin traditions. 
Thomas’s systematic theology is so wide-ranging and coherent that much Christian 
thought since may be considered either a development of or a response to his work. 
                                                
43 Ivan Petrella, Beyond Liberation Theology: A Polemic, (London: SCM Press, 2008), pp. 1-147. 
44 Petrella, Beyond Liberation Theology, pp. 148-150. 
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Furthermore, time and time again Aquinas’s theology has been of use when 
circumstances have asked theology entirely new questions that he could not have 
anticipated.  I will give two examples from among many. In the 16th century a 
pressing theological ethical question was: What are the rights of the natives of the 
New World? In the Valladolid Debates on this question both sides extensively used 
the Summa. These debates were one of the key starting points for the development of 
the modern notion of human rights.45 In twentieth century, Aquinas was also of some 
importance in developing theological responses to the rise of secular democracies 
where it could no longer be assumed that nearly all those participating in the public 
square were (at least nominally) members of the church, requiring cooperation with 
non-Christians in governing the state.46 
A final reason to consult Thomas in this research is that his body of thought is 
sufficiently broad that it provides sufficient scope to relate aspects of political and 
economic praxis to theoria.  
Speaking of the telos is better terminology for this exercise than that of eschatology 
because it follows an organizing principle of much of Thomas’s writings, where he 
worked from the purposes of things in creation toward theological and ethical 
insights. The ultimate realization of such purposes is often only possible in the 
eschaton. But speaking of purposes or final ends makes it clear that partial 
realization and motion toward the full realization is possible over these things entire 
span of existence. 
In order to take a telic perspective on the praxis versus theoria question, it is 
necessary to ask what is the telos of humanity. Exploring the answer to that question 
in Aquinas’s mature theology in the Summa Theologica is the purpose of the next 
chapter. There, I will argue that for Thomas the purpose of human life is to find 
happiness in God through a process of increasing conformity, that is of 
                                                
45 Gustavo Gutierrez, Las Casas: In Search of the Poor of Jesus Christ, trans. by Robert R. Barr, 
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1996), p. 199. Daniel R. Brunstetter and Dana Zartner, “Just War against 
Barbarians: Revisiting the Valladolid Debates between Sepúlveda and Las Casas”, in  Political 
Studies, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 733–752, at pp.739, 749-50  
46 Clifford G. Kossel, “Thomistic Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth Century” in Stephen J. Pope 
(ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 385-411 at pp. 
388-396. 
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sanctification, with the triune God in this life. This would appear to make theoria 
primary. However, Aquinas is emphatic that growth in charity is a necessary part of 
sanctification. Chapter 3 considers the question of what charity means to Thomas. 
Charity turns out not to be mere almsgiving but to be a mode of life involving 
gaining a thorough knowledge of the true needs of one’s neighbor and acting on this 
knowledge with wisdom to build peace among all in society. Such action in extreme 
situations may involve acts indistinguishable from revolutionary praxis: 
overthrowing the tyrant and redistributing wealth to satisfy the needs of the poor, for 
example. Nevertheless, several liberation theologians have claimed that Aquinas’s 
acceptance of private property inevitably makes him an ally of the status quo of 
global capitalism. Chapter 4 examines Thomas’s ethics of behavior in the economic 
sphere in the light of his teachings on charity. I will argue that this combination of 
teachings not only is capable of condemning a social order with grinding poverty and 
wide disparities of wealth, but also that it provides a vision of marketplace behavior 
that would work both toward filling the needs of all while teaching wisdom and 
charity to marketplace participants, acting as an exercise toward sanctification. In the 
final chapter I will conclude that for Aquinas reflectively examined individual or 
community Christian life is a mode of life (1) oriented toward knowledge and union 
with God (theoria) but which (2) necessarily involves praxis with the poor. Thus 
theoria may be primary in some formal sense, but increasing unity with God entails 
increasing unity of theoria and praxis. I conclude with a brief discussion of the novel 
contributions of this essay and of some possible topics for future research. 	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Chapter	  2:	  The	  Telos	  of	  Humanity	  
As discussed in Chapter 1, it is necessary to begin with a consideration of the 
question of what for Thomas Aquinas, is the telos, or purpose, or final end of 
humanity. 
William J. Hoye identifies the telos of human life in Aquinas with eternal life. Hoye 
attacks what he calls the “praxis prejudice” in contemporary culture and argues that 
the Christian doctrine of eternal life is incompatible with the primacy of praxis.47 For 
Hoye, the telos of humanity is eternal life. He identifies eternal life and the vision of 
God, relying in part on his etymology (not supported by citations) of “theoria” as the 
joining of “theos” and “horaō” (I see, behold, perceive).48 This seeing can only be 
complete after this life. Since actions can only be performed in the here and now, the 
primacy of praxis requires a realized eschatology. This praxis prejudice renders the 
seeking of eternal life immoral: this seeking diverts attention from changing reality, 
it engenders ethical behaviors that are in fact self-serving, it encourages the denial of 
the reality of suffering and injustice and an ecclesiology where the church becomes 
solely a social service agency. God becomes merely a background object who grants 
authority to the church to engage in projects of social change. 
Hoyle writes that the primacy of praxis is appealing to contemporary culture because 
culture is absorbed with a “technical mind set” where the attitude toward all things is 
that of a craftsperson toward the tools and products of the trade. This mind set makes 
humans the subject and reality the object. As God is real, this is also objectification 
of God, rendering encounter with God impossible. 
The difference between the technical and the eternal mind-sets is seen in two 
alternate exegeses of the parable of the Good Samaritan. In the praxis-oriented 
exegesis, the Samaritan becomes a neighbor to, comes to love, the injured man, 
through his acts of help. Hoye argues that a careful reading of the Greek text does 
not support this exegesis. Rather, the Samaritan is moved by compassion, 
                                                
47 William J. Hoye, The Emergence of Eternal Life, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
pp. 50-66.  
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experiencing a change of heart, becoming the injured man’s neighbor, then acts. The 
Samaritan permits himself to be acted upon. He allows himself to be object not 
subject. He becomes a neighbor to the injured man by taking the opposite stance of 
that required by the technical mindset. The Samaritan does not collect facts 
regarding the fallen man. Rather, “he has the ability to perceive reality affectively”,49 
a personal experience of seeing with the heart that engenders the unity with the other 
that is love. Out of that love, he acts. 
For Hoye, then, theoria is primary over praxis because to love God and to love one’s 
neighbor as oneself requires an orientation toward the eternal life of seeing God. One 
perceives God (however partially) affectively, then self, then neighbor. From this 
seeing of God loving action arises. Hoye points out that for Aquinas, all praxis has 
as its end “intellectual speculation”, the full perception of God by the human mind. 
Thus, the praxis of loving action has as its end the seeing of God by the actor, the 
acted upon, and those who see and understand the activity and its rootedness in God 
and reality. 
Ralph McInerny writes that the subject of the second part of the Summa is human 
action.50 The telos of humanity is what Aquinas says it is: happiness that is to be 
found “in loving union with God in the Beatific Vision”.51 However, the ability of 
humans to perceive God in contemplation is partial, temporary, and constantly 
interrupted by the need to satisfy necessities of life. Not everyone is able to or 
desires to engage in contemplation. Thus, Aquinas’s discussion of the telos of 
humanity serves to provide a formal substitute for the notion of the good life in the 
ethics of Aristotle, which Aquinas accepts as more or less those ethics that are 
naturally knowable. That is, the theology of the first part of the Summa Theologica 
and the treatise on happiness and humanity’s final end of Summa Theologica (ST) I-
II.1-5 can be treated in isolation from Thomas’s teachings on morality and law.52 The 
rational activity in which all engage begins not at the level of contemplation (theoria) 
                                                
49 Hoye, p. 59. 
50 Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1982), p. 1. 
51 McInerny, p. 30. 
52 McInerny, p. 117-126. 
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but at that of action (praxis).53  It would seem that for McInerny, theoria has priority 
over praxis in theory—in the formal structure of the Summa—but not in practice, not 
when attempting to act in accordance with its moral theology. 
According to A. N. Williams, Aquinas holds the view that the telos of human life is 
to become God.54 Thomas’s theology is meant to be a guide toward deification. The 
spirit is not only oriented and raised up toward spiritual truth by theology, but 
through it begins the process of deification. In the Fathers, nouns that seem to 
Westerners to be purely technical (e.g. adoption, union, participation), ethical (e.g. 
grace, virtue, and knowledge), or mystical (light, contemplation, glory, and vision) 
indicate respectively the process of deification, the growth of deiformity, and the 
consummation of sanctification. These terms mark a path of life that, entirely owing 
to God’s grace, leads toward unity with God.  
Williams argues that Aquinas holds to this view of deification throughout the Summa 
Theologica. For example, intellect will become deiform but those who practice 
charity have greater participation in “the light of glory”.55 Charity is the most 
important of the virtues that direct us to God, greater even than another, the 
knowledge of the God that we are to love.56 The purpose of theology is growth in the 
knowledge of God and in charity, where these form a virtuous cycle increasing the 
believer’s deiformity.  
Aquinas’s theology of the Trinity provides analogies that bring these points into 
clearer focus. Thomas’s descriptions of the characteristics of the divine persons 
extend the relations between the persons to include humanity. For example, “the 
perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in God the Father, and in God the 
Son”.57 Yet all creatures posses a likeness of the Son’s filiation in that they are sons 
or daughters and posses a likeness of the Father’s paternity in that they have potency 
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for creation. Rational creatures are called in Romans “sons and heirs of God” who 
have “the hope of glory”, that is, of deification. There is an analogy between the 
Son’s sonship and our adoptive sonship that holds in the present life and, in the life 
to come, promises a unity with the Father likewise analogous to that of the Son. 
According to Williams, the indwelling in the rational creature of all three Persons, 
the missions of the Son and the Spirit, and the gift to humanity of the Spirit all have 
a single purpose. That purpose is that the “rational creature is perfected … so as to 
enjoy the divine person himself”,58 that is, enjoy unity with God. But the gift of the 
Spirit that makes this unity possible is a gift of the charity of God.59 So to grow in 
conformity with the Spirit is to grow in charity. The Word has an intellectual 
mission. Yet this mission is not a delivery of perfect propositional knowledge: “Thus 
the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, 
but according to the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of 
love.”60 So for Williams, Aquinas’s theology gives assurance of the hope of 
deification and its contemplation aids in this intellectual illumination, whereby, 
through grace, love (and hence deiformity) may increase. 
Williams does not deal explicitly with the theoria-praxis question but, as the above 
discussion shows, it lies behind much of what she says. It appears that for Williams 
the theoria of contemplation leads to deification and love. Presumably loving action 
follows, as a result of growing conformity with the Father who sent Son and Spirit to 
a suffering world. Hence, if Thomas’s idea of the telos of humanity is deification of 
the sort described by A. N. Williams, then theoria is prior to praxis. 
There are several problems with this approach based on deification as the telos of 
humanity. The first problem is that by making understanding of God through 
theology central to deification, it privileges those with the inclination, gifts, and 
resources to pursue theological study.61 The second problem is pastoral. Most people 
today have themselves as idols: they need no convincing that they are divine and will 
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not be called to grow in faith or behaviour by a doctrine of deification. It also poses a 
problem of apologetics and evangelization, at least in areas of high Mormon 
population density: How does one make a distinction, easily understood by those 
with no theological training, between a Christian doctrine of deification and that of 
Mormonism? I believe that it is desirable to avoid that potential confusion altogether. 
There is one significant advantage of Williams’s concept of the telos of humanity: it 
ties together the first and second parts of the Summa. The knowledge and vision of 
God that is taught in the first part is what is to be attained by action as taught in the 
second part. 
Russell Pannier develops a set of criteria that a telos of humanity should meet.62 The 
telos should be instantly accessible to all humans during times of consciousness.  It 
should be fulfilling, in that given that certain (unspecified) conditions hold nothing 
else is desired. It binds human time together, its actualization in any moment 
bringing the desire and expectation that it continue at a deeper level in the next 
moment, even beyond death. Pannier observes that Aquinas’s specification of the 
telos of humanity as “union with God”63 meets his criteria. Union with God is 
instantly accessible to some degree whenever a human chooses. It is fulfilling 
provided that the condition holds that the human agent has had certain basic needs 
met: safety, sleep, food, and so on. But what of goods that are not completely and 
immediately necessary for physical life, for example play and aesthetic experience? 
Pannier suggests that these goods are more fulfilling when the human agent chooses 
to experience them as being also in the presence of God. 
Pannier does not go on to develop an ethics or consider the praxis-theoria question. 
However, others have noted that Pannier is teaching that that portion of the human 
telos that is accessible in the present life is a mode of being requiring a practice64 and 
is not merely an emotion.65 If that were the case, then taking Pannier’s conception of 
the telos of humanity would lead to acceptance of the primacy of praxis. However, 
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what Pannier describes may be a mode of being, but it is one that is theoria. It is 
experienced directly solely by the one human agent. It may change that one agent, 
but not reality directly, without actions by that agent. It is speculation, in the sense 
that is a form of seeing God.66  
There is one problem, at least with regard to the purposes of this essay, with 
Pannier’s concept of the telos of humanity as union with God. Pannier does not 
explicitly specify which god one is to make oneself conscious of. There is nothing in 
his argument that would not hold for other concepts of God, for example that of late 
eighteenth century deism. 
The reader will recall that the purpose of the above review of concepts of the telos of 
humanity in the Thomist literature was to select such a concept that can be used in 
answering the theoria-praxis question. I propose a concept that borrows elements 
from those of Pannier and A. N. Williams. The telos of humanity is, as Pannier 
writes, union with God. That union is actualized in the present life through an 
awareness of God’s presence whether engaging in activity or in prayer, liturgy, or 
quiet contemplation. This awareness requires the choice of the person, is repeated, 
and becomes habitual. As such, it constitutes a sort of spiritual exercise. 
Furthermore, the god which one makes oneself consciously in the presence of is the 
Christian triune God. In the context of the Thomist tradition, that means that the god 
with whom humans are to be united is the God described in the Prima Pars of the 
Summa Theologica. Keeping oneself ever mindful of being in the presence of that 
God is asking oneself to grow in conformity to that God. 
This concept of the telos of humanity meets Pannier’s criteria for such a telos 
because it specifies more completely the identity and nature of the God who is the 
object of human awareness. This specification does not invalidate any of Pannier’s 
reasoning that demonstrates that this sort of union with God in this life satisfies his 
criteria. Nevertheless, Karen Kilby has critiqued other authors, such as Giles Emery67 
and A. N. Williams, who have argued that Aquinas’s Trinitarian theology can be 
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read as an exercise toward conformity with the triune God.68 For her, Aquinas’s 
difficult technical language and logical inconsistency serve rather as lengthy 
demonstrations that God, and especially the Trinity are essentially unknowable, that 
they can never make sense to humans. In Pannier’s terminology, a telos of union 
with the triune God is not accessible to anyone. 
For example, in Thomas’s discussion of divine procession and as an intellectual 
procession, Thomas explains that in God we cannot differentiate between God as the 
source of procession and the God that processes: “[i]n God we precisely cannot think 
of difference between that which proceeds and that from which it proceeds.”69  To 
think otherwise is to deny God’s simplicity. But then has the word “procession” been 
emptied of meaning? To Kilby, Thomas has denied every notion of intellectual 
procession that might be graspable.  
Kilby finds a second example in Aquinas’s description of the Trinity as subsistent 
relations. For her this notion yields a vicious cycle. A Person is a subsisting relation, 
and that relation is a relation to another subsisting relation that is God. She claims 
that this cycle does not give the mind any purchase on the nature of the Trinity. 
Rather it confuses the idea of “relation” so that may be used to say something of 
God. Thomas does not ever explain what his modified notion of “relation” means. So 
the phrase “subsisting relation” does not say anything positive about the Trinity. 
For Kilby, these examples illustrate a pervasive problem in Thomas’s treatment of 
the Trinity considered as an exercise toward being ever mindful of the presence of 
God and increasing in conformity with God. This is, when the contradictions are 
boiled away Aquinas’s Trinitarian theology provides no positive understanding of 
the nature of God. Without such an understanding, from what does contemplation 
result and to where can it ascend?  Furthermore, if such contemplation were possible, 
it would privilege the theologian, or at least the seeker with sufficient leisure and 
intellectual inclination to study Trinitarian theology deeply, over other believers. 
This contradicts her presumption that the theologian should have no significant 
spiritual advantages over others.  
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But what then of Pannier’s assertion that being mindful of God’s presence is 
accessible to all? Does adding the idea that this God be the Trinity of Aquinas’s 
Prima Pars result in a telos that is accessible to anyone or to no one? I believe that 
the latter is the case. Recall that Pannier gives preconditions for accessibility: that 
the person has their safety, food and water, and shelter needs met, for example. For 
access to the telos of union with the triune God other preconditions are needed in 
addition. One is participation in liturgical prayer that ingrains in the participant 
Trinitarian language. Another is the reception of catechesis that gives that language 
meaning. These last two are (or at least, should be, where the Church is doing its 
work) available to all who seek to live a Christian life. 
It is possible to say more about how adding to the notion of the telos of humanity 
that it be union specifically with the triune God through an examination of Aquinas’s 
discussion of how God is known by the blessed.70 Although formally this question 
deals with knowledge of God that is fully available in the life to come, Thomas 
repeatedly describes the partial knowledge that is available in this life. 
In either life, the essence of God cannot be known by the bodily eye, but only by the 
intellect.71 This knowledge is not closed to humans: it is available to the created 
intellect, for the blessed see the essence of God in the life to come.72 Children are 
born without any knowledge whatsoever, of God or of anything else.73 Knowledge of 
God can increase in this life, “as our soul is abstracted from corporeal things and is 
capable of receiving abstract intelligible things”.74 This abstraction can never be 
complete in this life, as this life is material: we cannot see the essence of God in this 
life. The purpose of spiritual exercise, then, is to aid in this process of abstraction. 
The improvement of the knowledge of God and the illumination it gives to the 
believer has a linear component, directed over time from the complete ignorance of 
the newborn to seeing the essence of God in the life to come. This improvement 
must also have a component of repetition, of circularity, because only the blessed 
can see all of the essence of God at the same time, but we cannot understand many 
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things at the same time. We must understand successively in time.75 So we must 
work continually to keep mindful of the presence of God. But as we become more 
capable of receiving abstract intelligible things76 and the intellect strengthened over 
time by light received by grace,77 the same exercise brings a clearer knowledge of 
God.  
Our intellect cannot see God’s essence unless God unites Godself to our intellect.78 
So the strengthening of the intellect in order to see God is a form of increasing 
conformity with God: “The faculty of seeing God … does not belong to the created 
intellect naturally but is given to it by the light of glory which establishes a kind of 
deiformity.”79  
Now even though God can be seen only through the intellect,80 this strengthening 
deiformity changes the person in a manner beyond the strictly intellectual. That 
manner is strengthening charity in the person. For not all see the essence of God to 
the same level of perfection. Those that have more charity have a fuller participation 
in glory, that is, are more deiform.81 This would appear to involve a contradiction, as 
intellect and love are not at all the same thing and are indeed frequently considered 
opposites often in conflict. But in ascending to God the two must become one. 
The resolution of this apparent contradiction and the connection to Thomas’s 
Trinitarian theology is found in his treatment of the imago dei (ST I.93).82 In humans 
this is an image of God that is a likeness copied from God, but not of equality with 
God.83 Humans have this image in three ways:  
1. An aptitude for knowing God shared by all, 
2. Actively knowing and loving God, however imperfectly, and 
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3. A likeness of glory to the extent that the knowledge of God is perfected.84 
The first of these is by creation (nature), the second through re-creation through 
grace during the human life, and the third is available in the life to come. The image 
is to be perfected through life, growing better to imitate the God that fully 
understands and loves God’s self. 
This image of God is both an image of the divine nature and an image of the Trinity 
of divine persons; otherwise it is not a representation of the divine nature.85 Aquinas 
agues, citing his question on the divine persons and relations (in particular ST I.40.2) 
that only relations of origin distinguish the persons. But the origin of the imago dei is 
God. Thus the same relations are to be found in the image.  
These relations necessarily give rise to real distinctions. The Trinity is distinguished 
by “the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these”86. Likewise, when 
there is found in humans “a procession of the word from the intellect and a 
procession of love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity.”87 The 
Biblical texts that Thomas gives as support both concern human spiritual renewal: 
“Be renewed in the spirit of your mind…” (Eph. 4:23-24) and “… [the person] who 
is renewed into the knowledge of God, according to the image of the God who 
created [that person]” (Col. 3:10). This renewal is a step in the movement toward 
perfection of the imperfect image of God in a human.88 Thus, this movement toward 
perfection of the trinity in the imago dei is the unity of the word from the intellect 
and love from the will, and this is spiritual renewal. It is also the knowledge and love 
of God that is in the just,89 in those undergoing deification. 
But this knowledge and love of God is not passive and solely internal. It is active and 
affects the external. In humans, a word cannot be without the occurrence of thought. 
Knowledge of God leads through our thought to a word (i.e., an intellection) from 
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which love comes out from us. 90 If procession in God is perfect intellectual activity 
and perfect love united, then understanding them and their unity and distinction is on 
a path to perfecting these things in oneself.  But as a person is moving toward such 
perfection, love necessarily breaks out of the person into the world. This, then, is the 
spiritual exercise of Aquinas’s Trinitarian theology: the perfection of the imago dei 
through the understanding of God that breaks out in love.  
This understanding cannot be divorced entirely from Aquinas’ theoretical treatment 
of the Trinity. 91 In order to see that the imago dei is a trinity92 understanding of the 
theoretical development of processions and relations is required.93 The treatment of 
classes of names94 is a spiritual exercise in the limits of our understanding, 95 
following Pseudo-Dionysius’s Divine Names.96 But this treatment also underpins the 
understanding to what is meant when the persons of the Trinity are called Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit. It is through the technical discussion of the naming of the Son 
as the Word that we can see the analogy between the Word and the human intellect.97 
Likewise, through the technical discussion of the names of the Holy Spirit we find 
the analogy between Love and Gift in God and in humans.98 Finally, these analogies 
of Word, Love, and Gift allow the exploration of how the Son and Word work in 
humans, in Thomas’s discussion of the mission of the Divine Persons.99 
That mission is a mission out from God to humanity: the Son and Holy Spirit are 
sent out.100 If it is the case that what is being contemplated in the Trinity is both God 
and the imago dei, then there should be a corresponding sending out of both intellect 
and love from the contemplative silence of unknowing. And indeed Aquinas teaches 
this within the question on the mission of the Divine Persons.101 The invisible 
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mission of the persons is sanctification, and that sanctification involves perfection in 
both knowledge and charity. Those whom grace is sanctifying are improving as in 
the performance of certain acts, including “the fervor of charity leading … to the 
danger of martyrdom, or to renounce … possessions, or undertake any dangerous 
work.”102 Furthermore, those who participate more in the vision of God have greater 
charity because charity makes for greater desire for the vision of God, which in turn 
makes those with more charity better able to receive the vision.103 
But what does Thomas mean by “charity”? After all, what is translated into Latin as 
“caritas” is often translated into English as “love”, as for example in Paul’s 
description of the theological virtues “And now faith, hope, and love abide, these 
three; and the greatest of these is love.”104 In common English usage, “love” may 
refer to a large range of emotion, ranging from recognition of filial duty to altruism 
to lust. Furthermore, may the object of love be God or self? Does Thomas’s concept 
of charity include doing justice with, for, and to the poor? If it does, then theoria is 
primary over praxis. To answer that question, it is necessary to consider Aquinas’s 
definition and discussion of charity in his treatise on the theological virtues in the 
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Chapter	  3:	  Charity	  as	  a	  Mode	  of	  Life	  
In the previous chapter, I argued that for Aquinas the final end of humanity and of 
the individual human is unity with the triune God. Movement toward that unity is the 
process of sanctification that inherently requires growth in charity.  But what does 
“charity” mean to Aquinas? Is it, as the common modern usage of the word would 
have it, merely giving small amounts from our surplus to the so-called “deserving 
poor” or others whom we pity? 
No. Thomas taught that charity is much more complex than that. He devotes twenty-
three questions (in one English translation, two volumes) of the second part of the 
second part of the Summa Theologica to the concept. For Aquinas, the word 
“charity” has a vastly larger semantic range than it has today: it entirely encompasses 
love of God and love of neighbor.105 Or, relating it to humanity’s final end, charity is 
“our union of friendship with God.”106 The Summa’s treatment of charity concludes 
his discussion of the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity). But charity, being 
according to St Paul the greatest,107 receives the longest and most detailed treatment 
of the three. 
Over the last few decades, several authors have investigated the relationships 
between Aquinas’s concepts of charity, of good and of right (what Thomas would 
call “fitting”) actions, and of justice, including social justice. All virtues, theological 
or acquired, are things through which humanity moves toward our final end of unity 
with God.108 However, James Keenan has pointed out that, out of all the virtues, only 
charity is not a “complement of prudence”.109 That is, someone can live an ordered 
life through exercise of prudence and the other virtues excepting charity. As Keenan 
reads Thomas, right action results from the other virtues alone.  Only charity leads to 
perfection, which Aquinas equates with the unchangeable goodness of God. Even the 
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other two theological virtues imply a distance from this goodness. Faith is required 
because we know God’s goodness only in part. Likewise we need hope because we 
have only received a portion of God’s promises. Charity, however, unites a person 
immediately with God.110 Acts may be right (well-ordered) yet not good (tending 
toward unity with God). Charity provokes all morally good acts. To view this point 
the other way around, union with God already exists when one performs a morally 
good act. Charity is more present in the agent when that act must be strived for.111 
Charity is a virtue without a mean: it seeks rootedness and perfection within God, 
which cannot be over-achieved. Keenan holds that for Thomas charity has two 
functions. The first is to make us completely right and fitting, moving us toward the 
perfection we need to gain the final end. The second is that it allows us not merely to 
act rightly, but to act for the good, directing our actions toward the final end. 
Jean Porter begins her discussion of the relationships among charity, friendship, and 
justice in Aquinas by noting Gene Otka’s assertion that the most common property 
attributed to agape today is the equal regard for others entailed by love of 
neighbor.112 In determining how to treat others, what is of greatest importance is that 
we identify what we have in common with them. Such commonality must exist: at a 
minimum, there is our common humanity. That commonality we share with 
everyone makes us all equal before God and so we should have equal agape for all. It 
is startling to Porter, then, that Aquinas writes in his discussion of charity113 that 
instead that we are “not required to love our neighbors equally.”114 Instead there is a 
priority ordering among various objects of charity. We are to love God most of all. 
Next, one is to love oneself and one’s own body. Next, we are to love family: 
parents, spouse, brothers and sisters, and others to the degree of consanguinity. Then, 
we are to love others not related to us, in order of their holiness. Porter writes that 
Aquinas takes this position for two reasons. Firstly, it is natural that we love and 
have duties for those closer to us. Secondly, and more overtly theologically, Thomas 
holds that God does not love all people equally: he loves more those more receptive 
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to charity. As in charity we are emulating and uniting with God, we also are to love 
unequally on the same basis.115 This reasoning does not persuade Porter. She 
believes that Aquinas should focus on the infinite neediness before God that we 
share rather than on the infinitesimal differences in the amount of grace bestowed on 
individuals. However, she then goes on to say that Aquinas’s rejection of equality of 
regard for all in charity is required by his equating charity with Aristotle’s notion of 
friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aquinas means literally that God’s love for a 
person and that person’s response of love for God is friendship between God and 
human. One’s love for neighbor is based upon, formed, and informed by that 
person’s friendship with God. But according to Aristotle, friendship is possible 
between any two people, but the extent of friendship limited by many circumstances 
including distance in social position. In particular, for Aristotle friendship between a 
person and a god is impossible. Aquinas has to hold that for God and a person to 
have friendship God has to take the initiative. That initiative is God’s offer of 
friendship through Jesus Christ. A person responds to that offer by exercising 
charity.  That charity transforms the person to be more good like God is good, to be 
more holy. To Porter, differentially loving based on holiness is no different that 
loving God more than self or neighbor.  
Porter writes that Aquinas teaches that charity requires acts. The chief act from 
charity is love. But that love as an “affective response” is merely “sham 
sentiment”116 unless there is further action: acts of mercy including almsgiving and 
fraternal correction of those whose course toward the final end is drifting. 
Almsgiving is here much more than small donations to beggars. We must provide for 
the needs of others, following the same scheme of priorities for the amount of charity 
one is to have for neighbor. According to Porter, almsgiving requires giving to the 
needy what they require to survive. Circumstances can overturn the scheme of 
priorities. One is to aid someone who will die without food or other assistance rather 
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than one’s own father (one’s closest relative in Aquinas’s thinking), as long as one’s 
father’s situation is not equally dire.117 
Porter’s final topic is the relation between charity and justice in Aquinas. She is 
troubled by the fact that though Aquinas says that charity is required for justice, 
justice requires equal regard for all even though charity does not.118 Justice requires 
that all receive the basics of life and equal protection from harm. The protection 
from harm extends even to the criminal: only the state, never an individual, may 
inflict harm on a person as punishment for crime. In matters of justice, individuals 
are always equal. However, Aquinas holds it to be injustice when a person does not 
receive the physical or financial support that is due from another because of the 
nearness of relationship discussed in Aquinas’s scheme of prioritization of charity.119  
Stephen J. Pope also offers an interpretation of the relations between charity and 
justice in Aquinas.120 He begins by pointing out that modern discussions of the 
requirement to aid the poor use “justice” to mean duties to aid others that are binding 
on all and “charity” to mean purely voluntary giving of marginal significance both 
morally and in terms of practical and economic value. However, for Aquinas the 
Latin “caritas” (for which I have been writing “charity”) when meant as love for the 
poor had a vastly more inclusive meaning. Aquinas moves from a general definition 
of caritas as someone’s love for another person graciously enabled, inspired, and 
enriched by God through the first person’s love for God. Caritas for a poor person 
requires action, which Aquinas calls almsgiving, to meet their need. What is to be 
given includes material goods, but also the love that is friendship. “Love for the poor 
involves not simply the giving of goods but also and more importantly the love of 
friendship, the giving of self that involves affective union and communication as 
well and benevolence.” 121 It is in this manner that “if I bestow all my goods on the 
poor … but have not love, it benefits me nothing.”122 
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Pope writes that for Aquinas caritas is related to justice. Thomas, following 
Aristotle, considered justice largely as distributive: that each should receive what he 
or she is due. Mercy for the poor can create a moral debt, where acts are owed to the 
other because of the friendship that is love of neighbor. One is not in normal 
circumstances obligated to give so much to the poor that it lowers one’s social status. 
However the fact that failing to feed the poor can result in damnation (Matthew 25) 
means that God commands that one must give out of one’s surplus. To Aquinas, this 
is a moral debt because it affects the soul’s growth in unity or separation from God. 
However this debt is not in normal circumstances a matter for a human court of law. 
(There are special circumstances where courts or the State can order that one give to 
the poor.123) Thomas takes a middle, and situational, path between two extremes: that 
one should sell all that one has and give the proceeds to the poor, and that of modern 
neo-liberalism, where one is totally free to do whatever one likes with one’s 
property.124 
However, Pope admits that Aquinas’s view is, by late-twentieth century standards, 
paternalistic and hierarchical. Aquinas accepts that persons are divinely placed into 
roles that are “qualitatively distinct”.125 People are placed into classes where they 
practice the virtues appropriate to their class: the rich practice stewardship while the 
poor practice patience. Nevertheless, society is to be infused with love of neighbor, 
where all humble themselves for each other’s sake.126 Pope also agrees with modern 
critics of Thomas that he does not provide a concept of social change. However, 
Pope ascribes this to Aquinas’s belief that the capabilities of the State are terribly 
limited when compared to those of the Kingdom of God. Aquinas’s theory of charity 
is as an individual virtue, not a function of society. It is about changing one’s 
affections and actions rather than policies. Nevertheless, in his treatise on justice 
Aquinas enumerates a long list of sins which are injustices by which the poor are 
subjected, especially by what we would now call businesses: fraud, unnecessarily 
inflated prices, legal processes which unjustly favor the richer party, and usury. 
These injustices could and should be treated by the State as criminal. Thus, in at least 
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this admittedly limited way society as a whole does for Aquinas have some role in 
providing social justice.127 Pope argues that the modern position that dramatic social 
change is required to improve the lot of the poor is based on the assumption that 
there is constant increase in the production of goods, and that in an unjust society 
that increase goes mostly to increase the disparity between rich and poor. However, 
the world in which Aquinas lived was more static: there was a constant level of 
scarcity, interrupted by famine. In those circumstances, it was not clear what more 
individuals or the State could do for the poor other than provide for their basic needs, 
store food against famine, and enforce laws against unjust business practices.128 
Among Pope’s conclusions is that although in the modern world we do need to 
“strive for appropriate transformation of social, political, and economic structures” 
— a task that Aquinas did not envisage — Aquinas’s analysis of caritas and justice 
“wisely balances moral universalism with the natural priorities of special 
friendships” and the limits of human capabilities.129 
A recent paper by Meghan J. Clark is in considerable part a reply to Pope.130 She 
describes Aquinas’s concept of charity from two main perspectives. First, she 
characterizes what Aquinas means by charity, and then asks what it is to live in 
charity. Clark begins by pointing out that for Aquinas charity is something that God 
infuses in the human soul. While nature and reason point us toward God, these are 
not sufficient for us to reach our final end of happiness in God. It is God’s infusion 
of charity in us that makes this final end a possibility. All other virtues have the form 
of charity.  At the same time, charity is love and friendship with God, which results 
in love and friendship with neighbor. This love of neighbor is a participation in the 
love that God is. Thus, charity unites us with God.131 Although the other virtues point 
toward the final end, they cannot bring union with God unless they take the form of 
charity. So charity is literally supernatural: “it transcends nature” 132 in that it unites 
and brings communion one with God, which nothing in nature can do. As such, it 
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must be the work of God through the Holy Spirit. Charity can only increase or cease 
in a person, never decrease. Increase is further work of the Spirit as one’s acts of 
charity dispose one to further such acts. Charity can cease due to God’s withdrawal 
of friendship in response to one’s withdrawal of friendship from God as a result of 
committing a mortal sin.133 If charity is love of God, then why does it entail love of 
neighbor, that is, love of all other people? The neighbor is to be loved because the 
neighbor is has the potential of being united with God. That is, as God is in the 
neighbor, it is literally true that we cannot love God without loving the neighbor. We 
are to love neighbor for God’s sake: hence we are to love God more. So, there is a 
differentiation in the amount of love that we owe God and various neighbors. We are 
to love God most of all, ourselves next, then those close to us through ties of blood 
and friendship, then others, even if the others are better than our family.134 This 
prioritization of charity provides the structure that Aquinas uses to teach how to act 
out of charity with self and others. 
The second half of Clark’s paper asks what it is to live in charity according to 
Thomas.  She answers that living in charity involves both one’s internal and external 
life.  But in both cases living in charity is about acts. The primary act of charity is to 
love, not to be loved. Charity’s internal effect is mercy directed toward one’s 
neighbor. “Mercy signifies grief for another’s distress.”135 As such it is a passion, an 
emotion. It is an emotion that, guided by reason, leads us to works for the benefit of 
the distressed neighbor that are similar to the works of God.  However, one way in 
which our beneficent acts fall short of God’s is that ours are limited by our 
finiteness. It is impossible for any one of us to do good to everyone. Yet at any 
moment someone may cross our path for whom we may be able to do good, even 
someone who requires our aid for survival. We must continually be open and ready 
to act when that occurs. To be ready, we must prepare for such moments by 
removing obstacles to action, be they psychological, spiritual, practical, or in the 
ordering of our life.137 In other words, for Aquinas charity is not only love and 
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friendship for God and neighbor and a virtue. It is also a mode of life that must be 
lived in order to have charity. 
Clark’s concluding section is an evaluation of whether such living in charity, as 
Thomas conceives it, is adequate for today. She answers in the negative, and this is 
where she deviates significantly from Pope’s assessment. She identifies two parts to 
this inadequacy. The first is that Thomas identifies no role for social critique or 
social change in his concept of charity and that this makes it “problematic for 
addressing contemporary situations” where power structures must be challenged.138 
The second is that the priority ordering of charity is innately paternalistic, being 
modeled on God the father. Both inadequacies combine to render Aquinas’s theory 
of charity insufficient for examining communal sins built into the structures of 
society on national and global scales. However, she does not propose an alternative 
model. Instead, she states that “living in charity in the twenty-first century must 
begin with the mandate [to live in charity] found in Aquinas” along with further 
integration of justice, including analyses of structural injustices, with charity. 
More can be said, however, based on an examination of portions of the Summa 
Theologica’s treatise on charity that the prior research described above does not 
consider. Thomas’s treatment of each of the theological virtues follows a similar 
structure: 
• He develops a theory concerning the virtue, then 
• Uses the theory to discuss the acts done by one who has and grows in that 
virtue, and the vices that arise from lack of the virtue, 
• Gives an assessment of the place of that virtue in natural law and in the 
Decalogue, and 
• Concludes with a discussion of the gift of the Holy Spirit corresponding to 
the virtue.139 
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The acts associated with charity include love, peace, kindness, mercy, and 
almsgiving. The vices resulting from lack of charity are hatred, apathy, war (this is 
the location of Aquinas’s just war theory), envy, schism, sedition, and so on. The gift 
of the Spirit corresponding to charity is wisdom.  
I intend to examine more of the topics from Aquinas’s treatment of acts and vices 
associated with charity (1) to add some additional insights to the first answer given 
above concerning the role of charity in humanity’s final end and (2) to show that 
there are in fact some elements that can lead to social critique implicit in Aquinas’s 
treatment of charity. The particular acts and vices that I will consider are peace, 
sedition, and the gift of wisdom. 
Aquinas writes that peace is an effect of charity.140 It comprises two forms of union, 
an outward form and an inner form. The outward form includes concord, agreement 
between people. However, the outward form of peace is more than just concord. 
Concord occurs when people with different objectives and feelings are nevertheless 
able to come to agreements. In contrast, the outward form of peace involves the 
alignment of peoples’ feelings, desires, and goals and their movements (changes 
over time). The inner form of peace includes a lack of desire for things that cannot 
all be had simultaneously. The person experiences instead an inner harmony or 
union. Peace is present when this inner harmony or union is experienced by one 
person or extends to a group, which then sharing a union of affect and objective (and 
changes of these), are necessarily in concord.141 Such a state is a “union of 
charity”,142 where one’s desires are united with the neighbor’s, because each one 
loves the neighbor as oneself. Just as friends want good things for each other, we 
want to fulfill our neighbor’s will, just as the neighbor wishes to fulfill our will. 143  
In other words, peace is caused by charity, love of God and neighbor.144 All people 
desire peace. But perfect peace can only be found in enjoying the good, which is to 
say, enjoying God. Since enjoyment, that is to say unity with, God is not fully 
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realizable in this world; perfect peace is only available in the life to come. 145 Peace 
that is experienced in this life is a participation in that unity. Inward peace occurs 
when an individual participates in unity with God. Peace experienced within a group 
when all are participating in unity with God and therefore unity with one another. 
This characterization of outward peace is not limited to informal groups of people. It 
also includes the peace in the political sphere. In each article within his question on 
peace, he takes as his authority Augustine’s concept of peace in City of God.146 But 
Augustine’s presentation is explicit about what is required in the earthly city (i.e. in 
governments) for it to participate in God’s peace. It is necessary that people share in 
“safety and security” and “air to breathe, water to drink, the things appropriate for 
the care and adornment of the body in the way of food and clothing.”147 This requires 
“earthly peace in the earthly city”,148 a society which “provides whatever is 
necessary for the protection and maintenance of such peace.”149 
For Aquinas, due to ignorance and foolishness people misunderstand where peace 
lies and use incorrect means, including violence, to attempt to bring it about.150 In 
particular, an appearance of peace and concord that is obtained by means of fear is 
not peace at all.151 So-called “peace” obtained through fear and force, that is to say 
oppression, is false. 
Finally, on earth injustice is an obstacle to peace. No one can align their desires with 
others while being treated unjustly. That person desires justice, while others desire 
things that are resulting in the injustice. Justice is required to remove those 
obstacles.152 What Aquinas calls justice, which includes justice in economic 
affairs,153 is required to achieve peace and live in charity, which are in turn necessary 
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to grow toward humanity’s final end. This is a point I will consider further in the 
next chapter. 
Another reason to believe that by peace Aquinas includes peace in the civic realm is 
that he considers sedition to be a form of discord,154 and discord prevents peace and 
hence charity.155 Sedition is when part of the people of a State prepares for or 
engages in fighting against the State. It includes encouraging others to participate. It 
is an interference of the unity and well-being of the people of the State. It disrupts 
the State’s organs of justice and prevents people from acting rightly to each other. Its 
characteristic is that the fomenters of sedition place something else above the 
common good.156 This means that the leaders of a government can commit sedition. 
They do so when they place their good above the common good and foment discord 
among the population to ensure their own power. To act in what would otherwise be 
a seditious manner, including preparing for and engaging in violence,157 against such 
a tyrannical government is not sedition158 but rather an attempt to return the 
government to one that benefits the people.159 The evil done must be less than that of 
the tyranny, which imposes limits on when such revolution is permitted and the 
means used to engage in it.160 Note that the criteria for such “just sedition” are 
similar to those for just war,161 except that there is no sovereign authority for 
deciding upon just sedition. 
Just sedition is not the only response to tyrannical injustice that Thomas offers. 
There is also martyrdom, witnessing to truth and justice162 in a manner that 
inevitably leads to death at the hands of persecutors.163 Citing the example of John 
the Baptizer, Aquinas writes that the reason for a martyr’s execution may be solely 
that of reproving a ruler’s behavior.164 Martyrdom occurs because the divine good 
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exceeds the good of the State. “[A]ny human good in so far as it is referred to God, 
may be the cause of martyrdom.”165 That is, any injustice that separates people from 
God may lead the Christian to act in a way that lead a martyr’s death. 
But who decides when the government is tyrannical? Who decides whether to 
engage in speaking faith and truth in a manner that leads to martyrdom and what are 
the allowed means to overthrow the tyranny? Those who are wise, to the various 
extents of their wisdom. 
Aquinas writes that wisdom is a gift of the Holy Sprit166 that is a result of charity.167 
Wisdom is the ability to judge things rightly, knowing the most fundamental cause 
of things.168 That cause is God. For Aquinas, knowledge comes in two stages that 
repeat and form a virtuous cycle. First we come to have some knowledge of an 
object. Secondly, we come to love it. That love intensifies our ability to understand 
and therefore to know, bringing us back to the first stage but at a deeper level. In the 
case of knowing God, the first stage is faith, the love is charity, and the deeper 
understanding and knowledge of the second stage is wisdom.169 The cycle of gaining 
wisdom is bound up with the mode of life that is charity. As charity increases, so 
does the gift of wisdom. Wisdom is both practical and contemplative.170 That is, it is 
theoria as far as it considers the things of God. But “it judges of human acts by 
Divine things, and directs human acts according to Divine rules.” As wisdom judges 
and directs acts, it is practical.171 Wisdom, the “right judgment attained by some, 
whether in the contemplation of Divine things or in directing human affairs 
according to Divine rules” is an aspect of sanctification, with union with God.172 
The contemplative and practical effect of wisdom is peace making.173 That is, 
wisdom brings internal peace to one who has it. The wise act so as to set their things 
in order. Aquinas does not exclude from these things their role in civic affairs. Recall 
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that peace requires also the peace within the State, which in turn depends on the 
presence of justice. Thus, the gift of wisdom includes the ability to judge rightly and 
from the perspective of unity with God the things of social and government affairs 
and to act rightly with regard to them. 
Through the gift of wisdom, humans “participate in the likeness of the only-begotten 
and natural Son of God, according to Romans 8:29”.174 That is, wisdom makes a 
person a living analogy of the Word of God. But as was discussed in the previous 
chapter, to be the Word of God is to be sent out into the world with a mission to 
increase understanding and love, uniting humans closer to God, sanctifying them. 
Now it is possible to answer to the question of this chapter. For Aquinas, charity is a 
vastly more encompassing concept than the term commonly used implies today. It 
means to possess a love of God that unites one to God. As the neighbor is also 
uniting with God (or at least has the potential to do so), one must love the neighbor 
also. That love must show itself in actions that help the neighbor in need. If that need 
is dire, one cannot put one’s interests above that of the neighbor. Those who have an 
abundance of worldly goods, but deceive themselves and think that misfortune 
cannot find them, cannot gain the unity of emotions that is peace and so have no pity 
for the poor.175 Instead, charity requires that one be willing to act for the common 
good, and this may require one to give up one’s own property.176 One must be ready 
to give at any time, as God may give at any time, and that readiness is a mode of life. 
For Thomas, the need of one’s neighbor includes but goes beyond physical needs. 
Need is to lack something required to sustain either human physical life or the 
growth of virtue toward attending the final end of happiness in union with God. 177 
But charity goes beyond giving. It means to be at peace with others, to have one’s 
deepest, most heartfelt desires aligned with those of others. Such alignment of 
desires means to see and know, and therefore grow in love for one’s neighbor. That 
requires seeing people and situations as they really are, doing the right (just) things 
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for and to them so that all involved in the situation may grow in peace and charity. In 
other words, growing unity of friendship with God is inextricably linked to growing 
unity of friendship with neighbor. Friendship requires direct personal involvement, 
not mere support of a third party who sees and helps the friend. Thus, growth in 
charity requires not loving the abstract assistance of the poor but particular 
individuals. Support of institutions and governmental and non-governmental 
organizations that help the poor is necessary but not sufficient. 
From this point of view, a wide range of praxes ranging from conversation and 
engagement with a homeless person or prisoner to the base communities of 
liberation theology to faith-based community organizing are seen to be spiritual 
exercises with the purpose of building up charity among all who are involved. That 
is, the purpose is that they may live more fully into the mode of life of charity, which 
is what Aquinas means by increasing in charity, which is a necessary component of 
sanctification, the mission of the divine persons. To live that mode of life is being 
ready to be for others the Jesus Christ who gave food and drink to the hungry and 
healed the sick. Hence such living is participating (in the scholastic sense of sharing 
fundamentally in the form yet for now incompletely) in the love among the divine 
Persons and in their giving to humanity. This participation is a building up of the 
imago dei. This mode of life is one that requires praxis, yet at the same time is a 
spiritual practice that achieves the goal of contemplation: to be drawn closer to the 
final end of humanity, the vision of and unity with God’s essence. 
Thus, for Aquinas theoria and praxis are a unity. In order to increase perfection in 
one it is necessary to increase in perfection in the other. Their apparent separation is 
an artifact of human temporal and cognitive limitedness and the fallen-ness of the 
world. I will go further with these conclusions in the final chapter. 
If the conclusions of the previous two paragraphs hold, does that mean that Aquinas 
teaches mute acceptance of the political and economic status quo? We have seen that 
his teachings on peace, sedition, and wisdom make provision not only for critique 
but also for revolutionary change in political settlements. Thomas’s concept of 
charity allows a critique of social arrangements that do not rise to the level of 
tyranny. As charity requires a union of friendship with neighbor, social arrangements 
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and governmental policies that inhibit their development subvert charity and peace. 
Today, such social arrangements and policies would cover a broad range, including: 
• Land use and zoning (e.g., encouraging or discouraging segregation 
according to wealth),  
• Transport (e.g., requiring all productive adults to drive an automobile, which 
is isolating, vs. encouraging public transport and other alternatives), and 
• Education (e.g., tying assignments of pupils to schools to post codes or other 
de facto markers of wealth, race, or social standing, which results in or is a 
response to great disparities in school quality). 
The liberation theologians recognized, correctly in my view, that the dominant 
powers in the world today are at least as economic as they are political. If the politics 
of sanctification that includes praxis described in the previous paragraphs is to have 
an adequate concept of praxis, then it must: 
• Be able to critique our economic arrangements,  
• Allow the evaluation of alternatives, and 
• Permit working to change from our current economic arrangements toward 
the better alternatives. 
Whether or not Thomas’s theology provides these is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter	  4:	  Thomas’s	  Ethics	  of	  Economic	  Behavior	  
Economics – the study of wealth, poverty, the flow of money and the production of 
goods and services – is a key concern of liberation theology and the focus of much 
of the praxis from which its theological reasoning is done. For liberation theology, 
the Kingdom of God is an economic order where the present dichotomy between rich 
and poor has been eliminated because all have equal access to the riches of the Earth. 
In the present world, the existence of poverty is maintained through the sinful 
acceptance of private property and the idolization of wealth.  The forces of capital in 
the rich countries, in order to maximize profit, extract resources from the poor 
countries at unfairly low prices and sell manufactured goods at unethically high 
prices. The populaces of the poor countries in debt peonage, a state of de facto 
enslavement by the rich and influential of their own nations. These rich are 
maintained in power by the governments of the rich countries which act as agents of 
capital. It is this enslavement from which the poor require liberation. In order to 
achieve this liberation, a new social order must be constructed, based on the 
teachings of Jesus, where the satisfaction of the basic needs of all is the priority. The 
system of private property is not required in order to achieve this goal.178 In 
particular, Aquinas’s acceptance of private property is a provision for a sinful world. 
But it is possible to construct a society where that provision becomes less necessary 
over time. That is, according to one analysis, Aquinas 
suggests that private property may be the best way in practice to maintain 
economic production and social order. However, for Aquinas this situation is 
the result of human selfishness arising from original sin. In consequence 
liberation theologians argue that this sinful selfishness will be overcome as 
the ‘new land’ is approached. For instance, natural resources such as land and 
water are considered by economists as essentially public goods, and 
constitute the first step in the recovery of common ownership…179 
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Both capitalism and socialism are human constructs and hence sinful. But of the two, 
Liberation Theology holds the economics of socialism to be closer to that of the 
Kingdom to come.180 Aquinas’s theological ethics of behavior in the economic 
sphere is fatally enmeshed with capitalism and the interests of the wealthy (i.e., is a 
constituent of what liberation theologians calls the “civilization of wealth”) and 
opposed to the interests of the poor (the “civilization of poverty”). The civilization of 
wealth, including Aquinas’s theological ethics, will be swept away in the 
eschatological struggle between these civilizations.181 The primacy of praxis over 
theoria in theology is required in order to re-orient the activity of the church and of 
Christians toward creating the socialist society that is to be the actualization in 
history of the civilization of poverty.182 
It would be a strong counter-argument against the work of the previous two chapters 
were it the case that Aquinas’s theological ethics must be discarded based on this 
line of reasoning that requires the primacy of praxis. The liberation theologians are 
correct in noting that the post-Columbian history of Latin America has largely been 
one of exploitation of the many by the few. The objective of the Spanish colonial 
government was to extract as much silver and gold as possible without regard for the 
lives of those not born on the Iberian Peninsula. After independence, the new 
governments continued (and in many nations, continue) to prioritize crippling 
interest payments on loans from European and North American banks over the 
health and welfare of their own people.183 So, in order to refute such a counter-
argument, I must show that Thomas’s economic ethics would also condemn this 
history and this present state of exploitation and gross inequity. In this chapter I 
argue that: 
• Rather than accepting sin, Aquinas provides an ethics of economic 
behaviour that would condemn today’s global economic practices and 
institutions that lead to grinding, deadly poverty,  
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• In particular, although Thomas by no means demands equality of wealth, 
there is a limit to the inequity that he would accept, and that the current 
disparity of wealth in the world is beyond that limit, 
• This ethics of economic behaviour is an application of Aquinas’s concept of 
sanctification as discussed in the previous two chapters, and 
• Therefore it is not necessary to take praxis as primary even when 
considering (as we must) the plight of the poor. 
Much of Aquinas’s mature teaching concerning economic behaviour is found in his 
discussion of justice in the Summa, as part of his consideration of the topics of 
property and theft, commerce and cheating, and lending and usury. (In this essay, 
“usury” will carry Aquinas’s meaning, namely charging any amount of interest on a 
loan and not the current common meaning of charging excessive interest.184) 
Aquinas begins his discussion of property by noting God has granted humanity 
dominion over many physical, created things. God has given us this power because 
humanity needs to make use of these things in order to survive.185 It is necessary to 
human life that individuals can possess property privately for two reasons. First, 
because anyone is a better steward of what they own than what is owned in common. 
Second, if everything were owned in common there would be endless quarrelling 
about how to use everything. Peace would be impossible in the resulting disorder. 
Therefore, many things have been assigned to the stewardship and fitting and proper 
use of particular people, that is, many things have owners. Private property is not a 
matter of natural law, that is, it is not a necessary consequence of the nature of God’s 
creation. It is rather an outcome of human reason seeking the proper stewardship and 
use of things, consequently encoded in human, positive law. The only just reason for 
disparity of wealth, that is, that some have stewardship of more than others, is that 
some are more capable stewards. Although Aquinas quotes St. Basil the Great: 
“Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of 
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a good stewardship…?”,186 Aquinas provides no additional support for this point, 
believing that the reader will accept it as a matter of reason. Assuming such a just 
distribution of goods, then taking what is under the stewardship of another by threat 
or violence (robbery) or by cheating or stealth (theft) are sins.187  
However, not only is it neither robbery nor theft to take what is truly needed,188 it is 
lawful. “In case of need all things are common property. … That which [someone] 
takes for the support of his life becomes his own property by reason of that need.”189 
Human, positive law cannot trump natural and divine law. According to the creation 
stories of Genesis, the purpose (nature) of the goods of the Earth is to be the means 
of human life. Human laws defining who owns what things do not change the natural 
law that human life depends on these same things. When some possess a surplus of 
goods, it is only because they are to steward them for the purpose of providing for 
the needs of the poor.190 To refuse to give the poor what they need is itself theft. The 
poor are due what they need, and “To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the 
same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust detention is 
included in an unjust taking.”191 Governments may take from their citizens what is 
“due to them for safeguarding the common good”, even if violence is needed to 
overcome the resistance of the erstwhile owners.192  
Possessions may be bought and sold, but transactions must be just. It must be 
possible to exchange things in order that people’s needs are satisfied. Trade in 
commodities necessary to support life is praiseworthy.193 Providing for needs 
through buying and selling is more common and often more effective than outright 
giving, and therefore God and God’s law encourages many forms of trade.194 The 
price for which something is sold may be more than what was paid for it. The 
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purpose of the resulting moderate profit is to compensate the seller for his or her 
time and risk in acquiring, transporting, and preparing the goods for sale, support the 
seller’s family, and assist the poor or perform some other public good. On the other 
hand, trading of money for money or any commodity with solely the objective of 
large profits serves no just end.195 
The price paid for something should not be dramatically different from its worth, 
often referred to in the Thomistic literature as the “just price”. The purpose of money 
is to measure the quality and usefulness to humans of things sold. So when anything 
is sold for too much or too little compared to its just price, money is being misused 
in a way that is unjust. That is, a price that is too high is an injustice to the buyer; a 
price that is too low is an injustice to the seller. Suppose there is more than one 
potential buyer in need of some thing, in the sense that they will suffer196 without it. 
The price may then be higher than otherwise, but not more than it is worth to the 
seller (presumably including the modest profit described above). That some thing is 
of greater advantage or usefulness to the buyer than to the seller is also no reason to 
charge an excessive price. The advantage is due to the circumstances of the buyer, 
not the seller, so the seller should not benefit abnormally.197 Before closing a 
transaction a seller must give to the buyer all information possessed concerning non-
obvious defects in anything being sold.198 
Governments may regulate buying and selling in order to ensure that too much 
wealth does not concentrate in too few hands. Evening out over-concentration of 
wealth is a matter of the survival of the state, even of social order. Too much 
inequality of wealth will lead to the depopulation of a nation. Thomas does not 
describe the mechanism of the decline in population.199 
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Thomas is even harder on the world of finance, the marketplace for money, than he 
is on the marketplace for goods. As an Italian aristocrat of the 13th century, he was 
probably familiar with nascent forms of modern banking. Minute books survive from 
1154 documenting the operations of a Genoese firm doing credit for traders and 
governments, foreign exchange, and merchant banking. Interest rates for loans from 
Italian sources in the 12th century could be as high as 20% or even 100% per 
annum.200 
He condemns as sin all usury, any charging of interest on loans.201 According to 
Thomas, neither money nor anything fungible with money may be given to a lender 
as a condition, explicit or implicit, of a loan being made. Suppose, however, that 
money is lent to tradesman or merchant as an investment in a business. This is 
making an association for a common purpose, namely better to satisfy the needs of a 
community and receive a just profit. In this case, the lender may receive a share of 
the profit.202  
The first reason Aquinas gives for the prohibition of usury is that it is a form of 
oppression of the poor. The reason is biblical: “It is written (Exodus 22:25): ‘If thou 
lend money to any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not 
be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries.’”203 Lending and 
charging interest leads to inequality at a level that reaches that of injustice. It disturbs 
the natural equality that all humans share.204 Aquinas interprets interest as being a 
charge for the use of the money lent. The purpose of money is to be spent to obtain 
that which is needed to support life. To use it is to spend it. When money is alienated 
from a buyer in exchange for some good, he no longer retains its form (in Aristotle’s 
sense of the word), the value it represents.205 Therefore, when both interest is 
charged and a loan must be repaid, the borrower is both fully returning what was lent 
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and also paying for its use, in effect paying for the money lent in two different 
ways.206 
Why then should anyone ever lend? Aquinas writes that we should lend due to 
benevolence and love.207 He quotes Luke 6:35: “Lend, hoping for nothing thereby.” 
Lending should not be done in hope of profit but be an act of hope in God, reaching 
out to the borrower that his needs will be fulfilled.208 
Much secondary literature does not accept that Aquinas’s economic ethics is as 
characterized by liberation theology (i.e., as an acceptance of sin and the culture of 
wealth). Aquinas is dismissed by many researchers in the fields of economic and 
business ethics and the history of economics as being fundamentally hostile to the 
worlds of the marketplace and finance.209 One ethics primer states that, like Jesus and 
St Paul, Aquinas “made wholesale attack on business practices”.210 Some authors, 
even while writing approvingly of parts of Aquinas’s economic ethics soundly 
condemn other portions. For example, in an article arguing for positive 
reconsideration by economists of Aquinas’s notion of a just price, David D. 
Friedman writes that the notion of just price became tainted by association with 
Aquinas’s condemnation of usury.211 Indeed, Friedman writes that Aquinas’s 
classification of usury as a sin is “notorious” and “prevented transactions from 
occurring” (the failure of a transaction to be completed being to Friedman and his 
intended audience a great evil).212 Others see the economic ethics of Aquinas and 
other Scholastics as a strategy by the Christian religious leadership to slow or stop 
the emergence of economic competition to the dominant political and commercial 
interests with which the Church was enmeshed.213 
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According to Mews and Abraham, the Scholastic condemnation of usury was a 
response to “crippling interest rates being charged in urban centers”. Both 
Franciscan and Dominican preachers working prior to Aquinas taught that usury was 
wrong as a matter of law. Aquinas’s contribution was to alter the grounds of 
discussion of usury by arguing that relationships between the parties involved in 
lending for interest are unequal in a manner contrary to natural justice.214 
Two recent journal papers each go part way toward providing links between 
Aquinas’s economics and his notion of sanctification. In the first, Luke Bretherton 
provides new insights into the nature of the inequality that arises from usury. 
Bretherton writes that the scriptural treatment of usury teaches that it is not solely an 
economic act: usury is political. It demarcates who is within and who is without the 
community.215 In the Torah, lending is encouraged yet lending for interest to and 
permanent debt slavery (in the event of default on a loan) of fellow Jews and those 
residing with them are prohibited. Among other places, this prohibition is found in 
Exodus 22:25: the text noted above as having been quoted by Aquinas as a notable 
scriptural basis for the prohibition of usury. These laws work together to ensure that 
while robust economic relationships flourish, a rough sort of equality within the 
community and before God is periodically re-established. However, both lending for 
interest and debt slavery are permitted when the borrower is a foreigner. There is to 
be a level of mutuality within Israel’s economic life. However, opportunities to 
exercise economic power over members of neighboring nations may be taken. In the 
economic sphere, co-religionists are to be treated as friends and those from other 
nations as real or latent enemies. The charging of interest and debt slavery are 
weapons that weaken the enemy. Bretherton quotes St Ambrose: “He fights without 
a weapon who demands usury; without a sword he revenges himself upon an enemy, 
who is an interest collector from his foe.”216 Payment of interest weakens the enemy. 
When the enemy is weakest, the loan cannot be repaid and the enemy is further 
crippled by debt slavery or other penalties of default. However, Jesus taught that we 
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are to love our enemies (Mth 5:44), witnessing to Christ’s love that makes possible 
friendship among all humanity. But then usury, being a weapon wielded during 
peace or war at enemies outside the community, is prohibited. Christ universalizes 
the notions of nation, people, and community of friendship. But then the ban on 
usury is universalized also.217 
Bretherton does not explicitly connect back to Aquinas’s notion of deification as the 
final end of humanity. However, such a link is not difficult to make. As we have 
seen, Aquinas objected to usury on the grounds of the inequality it necessarily 
produces. If we accept the notion of usury as a weapon, then the inequality produced 
by lending to the needy for interest is like the inequality of an armed person exerting 
her or his will upon an unarmed person. It constitutes a differential of power that 
renders impossible the acting out of love of neighbor, building peace within and 
without, and growing in justice which is a necessary component of contemplation 
and therefore of growing unity with God. 
Another recent paper on Aquinas’s notion of the just price goes part way toward 
connecting Thomas’s ethics of economic behavior with his notion of sanctification 
and envisioning how it could work in today’s world.218 Its authors, Daryl Koehn and 
Barry Wilbratte, propose that Aquinas’s “just price” should be interpreted as the 
“just person price,” the price that a just person would pay. This just person would 
take into account the “well being of all who are parties to a given transaction and the 
good of the larger community.”219 In the case that both the buyer and seller are just, 
the price they arrive at will consider that both must live, support their families, and 
that public life must also be supported. In this way, the just person price is a price 
that is good for all participants in a transaction and for society as a whole. To arrive 
at the just person price, both buyers and sellers are to be reflective, understanding the 
costs and benefits associated with the good being exchanged and the needs of the 
others involved in the exchange and of the community. The just person price may be 
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higher or lower than the price that would be assigned by the neo-classical market, 
where price is a function only of supply and demand.220  
Those who engage in commerce in this manner, with reflection and concern with the 
needs of others, are practicing doing justice. Indeed, economic exchanges are such a 
frequent part of life that they would be for most people the most common and 
accessible form of such practice. A greedy person, whether buyer or seller, consults 
only her or his own appetite for gain and does not consider the needs of others. Such 
a person will happily take a gouging price, an excessively high or low price that is 
obtainable due to sudden fluctuations in supply or demand. But such a person is 
practicing doing injustice rather than justice. Not only are they depriving others of 
what they need in order to secure their gain; they are depriving themselves of the 
virtue of justice.221 On the other hand, the just buyer or seller is, and grows, more 
focused on the needs of others and the community.222  
What is learned in perceiving and reasoning about the needs of other individuals and 
the community is transferred to other situations where one must act justly. In other 
words, through being a just person in economic exchanges, one learns how to be just 
in other, weightier matters.223 Aquinas allows reasonable profits to be made. 
However, the just person who profits from justly priced transactions—having grown 
in knowledge of the needs of others, in reflective reasoning regarding self and others, 
and in practical justice—will in part use those profits to help the neighbor.224 
The just person price will not generally be the same as the price in the market as 
generally understood by economists and practiced by business firms. This market 
price is set in great part by demand from customers that include the foolish and 
supply from sellers that include the predatory. Perhaps more important is who does 
not have the opportunity to participate in the setting of prices by supply and demand: 
those who are too poor or otherwise excluded as marginalized members of society. 
Neither they nor their needs are accorded a role in price setting in the neo-classical 
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market.225 That is, a supply-and-demand price serves the needs of those who can 
afford to participate in that market. It is incapable of serving the needs of the poor. A 
marketplace based on the just price includes even the poorest and most marginalized 
because it accounts for their needs and not solely their ability to pay. This inclusion 
of the poor and marginalized provides the sellers and other buyers with the 
opportunity to help them, to provide what is necessary for a full life, through the 
transactions that take place.226 The notion of just price “unlike the exchange price of 
neo-classical economics, recognizes [the] duty to the poor and brings this duty so to 
speak into the market exchange itself”.227 
Under supply-and-demand pricing, the goal of economic activity is to maximize the 
monetary volume of goods exchanged and efficiency leading to maximum profit. 
Under just person pricing, the goal of economic activity becomes the personal and 
social life of all persons. 228 For this reason, the considerations used in arriving at a 
just price for something must include the externalities of producing or using the 
thing, for example, environmental effects and social costs.229 Things may exist that 
have no just price, because they inevitably cause harm. 230 
Koehn and Wilbratte do not attempt to relate their elucidation of Aquinas’s concept 
of just price to other elements of his ethics or theology. However, there are a number 
of similarities between the person who can set a just person price and the person, 
described in the previous chapter, who is infused with charity and wisdom, growing 
in a virtuous cycle toward conformity with God and bringing peace to self, others, 
and the community. Both are outwardly focused, able to perceive the true needs of 
the neighbor. Both act in such a way as to balance the neighbor’s needs, their own 
needs, and the needs of family or others for whom they are responsible. The person 
who is strong in charity sees people and situations as they really are, doing the right 
(just) things for them. The person who is able to determine a just price perceives not 
just the economics of a deal, but also the situations of the people involved in the 
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transaction. The just person, in their economic dealings, is treating others as friends, 
giving all involved the opportunity to increase the alignment of affections which 
grows peace.  
In short, the person who works faithfully at setting just prices and participating in 
just transactions is a person being conformed to God through charity, acting in the 
economic sphere. The marketplace has a purpose: to be a means that supports the 
final end of humanity. It does this in two ways. The first is the overt one of 
providing the means of full human life. The second is to be an occasion for training 
the virtues of charity, wisdom, and justice in practical situations where the needs of 
the neighbor must be fully taken into account. Any 
• individual price or transaction, 
• type of transaction or financial instrument, 
• means of joint ownership and management of assets and business activities, 
such as the modern corporation, 
• human laws regulating economic activity, or 
• system of interlocking economic and state power, 
is to be judged by its suitability for providing these two means of humanity’s final 
end of happiness in God. 
Aquinas’s analysis of usury can be viewed as the working out of such a judgment for 
the case of loan transactions. He judges that charging interest is incompatible with 
the learning of charity, peace, and justice on the part of the lender. Someone who 
needs money to satisfy her or his physical needs may obtain an interest-bearing loan 
because no one can grow in charity, peace, and justice when lacking food, shelter, 
and the like, and “it is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end”.231 
Exactly the same process of judgment is applicable to both the current form of global 
capitalism and the historical economic practices in the countries of the liberation 
theologians. Neo-classical economics and neo-liberal politics of the powers and 
principalities of the global economy evaluate economic practices on the criteria of 
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maximization of economic growth and profits. In other words, a transaction is good 
as long as both parties agree to it and it does not result in a future decline of 
economic activity. The good of the other party to a transaction is not to be 
considered. Quite the opposite: a transaction, such as a high interest rate loan, that 
binds the other party to a lifetime of similar transactions is “good”, because it results 
in a high level of spending for life, at least on such transactions. But this is virtually 
the situation against which the liberation theologians were reacting. The primary 
difference was one of scale: whole Latin American nations were and are in debt 
peonage, not only individuals.232 Were the ethics of the marketplace as envisioned by 
Aquinas, with all caring for each other, then the distribution of the goods of the earth 
would closely match what are the needs of each and the ability of each effectively to 
steward these goods. Extreme disparities of wealth would be impossible. No one can 
be millions of times a better steward than anyone else. All have the same basic needs 
for sustaining life and similar needs for making life full. Therefore, economic and 
governmental institutions that promote and protect a situation where some have 
millions of times more wealth than others are setting up stumbling blocks to 
humanity’s final end rather than participating in humanity’s sanctification. This is 
not at all what the liberation theologians accuse Aquinas of: a mute acceptance of a 
concept of private property where a few own nearly everything. 
Now it would seem that the foregoing depends on marketplace participants being 
reasonable, just, perceptive, wise, and charitable. But it should be remembered that 
Aquinas classifies unjust marketplace behavior as cheating,233 which, as it is done 
secretly is a form of theft.234 Theft is a mortal sin: it is punishable by the civil 
authority according to the human positive law by any punishment including death, in 
order to teach others.235 There are two reasons why a human government may 
happen to permit some unjust behavior. One is that it is not practical to legislate 
against all possible acts of vice. But theft is unjust enough that it must be against 
human law.236 The other is that a government may be acting for the good of its 
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leaders and not its people. But, as was discussed in the previous chapter, this is 
tyranny and Aquinas teaches that tyrannies may be overthrown. Thus, governments 
are obligated to use the law to teach ethical marketplace behavior, up to some limit 
of practicality. 
In the previous chapter, I described a cycle in which charity (a result and measure of 
deification, which is theoria) leads to acts of love for neighbor (praxis), which leads 
to peace and understanding of the neighbor (the fruit of praxis), which leads to an 
increase of charity. Both theoria and praxis are found in this cycle without either 
being prior to the other. As Aquinas’s ethics of economic behavior is an application 
of his concept of deification and its growth through charity, it should inherit the 
same cyclic structure and lack of primacy of either theoria or praxis. This inherited 
structure is what Koehn and Wilbratte have found in their concept of the growing 
justice of the person engaging in the setting of just prices. To put it another way, as 
with Trinitarian theology and charity, for Aquinas the buying and selling are a form 
of spiritual practice. 
Justice is another result and means of deification, as God is ultimately just. So justice 
is a form of theoria. Aquinas teaches that justice leads to economic transactions that 
benefit the neighbor, addressing their true needs, which is praxis. The peace and 
understanding of the people engaged in such a transaction is increased by the 
experience, which grows justice: theoria again. 
This structure exactly parallels that of the cycle of charity, with the same roles for 
theoria and praxis. Neither is primary. Yet any one individual or community must 
join the cycle at some point. That point may appear to be primary to them, because 
that was the place through which the beginning of their path of sanctification passed.  
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Chapter	  5:	  Conclusions	  
In Chapter 1, we saw that the liberation theologians argue that praxis must 
henceforth take precedence over theoria. They observe that the poor of the Earth are 
being oppressed and killed. They must be liberated. Primacy of theoria supports the 
status quo, the power of the oppressor, with whom the church and theology are 
enmeshed. The focus on the individual soul promoted by primacy of theoria leaves 
theology unable to act in the world against the Powers of individual and corporate 
wealth and political and social structures that protect it. Theology itself requires 
liberation from the Powers of this world before it can aid the poor. That liberation is 
the primacy of praxis. Liberation of theology is to be found in the re-definition of 
truth in terms of praxis rather than theoria: Truth is what is efficacious for liberating 
the poor. The resulting theology will be a theology of the cross, where the atoning 
sacrifice of the death of Jesus is the ultimate praxis. So, the cross is the viewpoint 
from which other praxis is reflected upon. 
Given the explorations of the theology of Thomas Aquinas in Chapters 2 to 4, where 
does this argument for the necessity of the primacy of praxis break down? Where it 
breaks down is in its assumption that either theoria or praxis must be primary. If that 
assumption were correct, then the primacy of theoria in theology would lead to its 
fatal enmeshment with the Powers, and then praxis must be primary. 
But for Aquinas, the middle is not excluded here. Neither theoria nor praxis need be 
primary. There is a purpose, a goal, to human life, namely happiness in unity with 
God, growing the imago dei in the human person. But that growth cannot occur 
without growth in love for God and neighbor (charity). Not only growth, but even 
having charity within one at all depends on praxis. The Christian life is a mode of 
life (1) oriented toward knowledge and union with God (theoria) but that very 
orientation requires that one have (2) knowledge and union with neighbor, which (3) 
necessarily involves praxis with the poor. Thus truly seeking union with God yields 
solidarity with and knowledge of the poor and their situation. Far from being 
abandoned, Matthew 25, 1 John, and so on are central to our uniting with God and 
our neighbor. For Aquinas, theoria is primary in some formal sense. However, 
theoria is impossible without charity. But when we ask how one would be a person 
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growing in charity, in Aquinas’ sense but in today’s world, we find that charity is in 
turn impossible without praxis. 
Now recall that Aquinas is insistent upon the simplicity of God.237 Even though God 
is simple, God created, creates, and sustains creation. Furthermore, the Word and the 
Spirit have missions in the world and irrupted into history. Thus, motion toward 
unity with God means increasing unity of self that includes increasing unity of 
theoria and praxis. Thus, in the limit (unattainable in this life) theoria and praxis are 
one. 
Those truly seeking liberation for the poor from poverty and oppression learn charity 
(in Aquinas’s sense as discussed in Chapter 3). Yet God is charity. Union with the 
poor leads to union with God. There is no primacy, but rather a virtuous cycle that 
can be entered through more than one path. But human cognition is limited to 
working in temporal sequence. So any one individual or community necessarily 
enters into this mode of life through either theoria or praxis. In their experience and 
reflection, that one seems to have priority. 
In Chapter 3, we saw that Aquinas taught that in severe situations, the mode of life 
that is charity could require the violent overthrow of tyrants, that is, revolution. The 
justice required by charity can demand the re-ordering of economic affairs (Chapter 
4). If a government makes realignment of economics toward justice impossible 
because its leaders are benefiting from the status quo, then it is tyrannical (Chapter 
3). Thus, those engaged in the mode of life Aquinas describes are required to act in 
the world—using even the most unusual and extreme measures when the situation, 
justice, and charity so demand—against the Powers of individual and corporate 
wealth and the political and social structures that protect it. Thus, the argument of 
liberation theologians for the primacy of praxis fails in a second manner: Primacy of 
praxis is not necessary to act against the Powers. 
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Now this is not to say that praxis does not have an important role in the mode of life 
that Aquinas teaches. Praxis and reflection on praxis provide a corrective. Where the 
neighbor suffers either the Christian or the church do not act, there is a failure of 
perception, virtue, and or theology. Reflection is required to identify and address the 
failure. (Observe that reflection is an aspect of theoria and fixing a failure is an 
aspect of praxis. Once again we find that they are bound together.) 
Finally, the mode of life that Aquinas teaches does depend on acts in history that are 
prior to it. But these acts are not those of humans but of God: the creation of history 
by the Father through the Son, the missions of the Son and the Spirit (Chapter 2), the 
foretastes of unity of God and neighbor that we receive in this life (including the 
sacraments), and the promise that that unity will be fulfilled. 
I believe that this essay contains several novel contributions in addition to the above 
argument: 
• The connection between the interpretation of Aquinas’s Trinitarian theology 
as a spiritual exercise and the centrality of charity in that exercise (Chapter 
2), 
• The extension of recent research on the acts required by Aquinas’s concept of 
charity to include the roles of peace, justice, and wisdom in charity, the 
conclusions made concerning political praxis based on this extension, and 
connecting that to the Aquinas’s concept of sanctification (Chapter 3), 
• Relating other scholars’ work on Thomas’s concept of just price and 
prohibition of usury as justice to his concept of sanctification (Chapter 4). 
Finally, this essay leaves open some areas for possible future research. The most 
apparent one comes from noting that Aquinas was the inheritor and teacher of a 
distinctly Dominican spirituality that emphasized the role of happiness in one’s 
spiritual life and practice.238 The human telos of unity with God is to produce our 
ultimate happiness. An opportunity for extending the present research would be to 
examine the role of happiness in the mode of live envisioned by Aquinas, 
                                                
238 Paul Murray, The New Wine of Dominican Spirituality: A Drink Called Happiness, (London: 
Burnes and Oats, 2006), pp. 1-44. 
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incorporating sources from the Dominican community of around Aquinas’s time, 
such as Jordan of Saxony and Humbert of Romans. Such an extension might also be 
able to relate more clearly Thomas’s (or the Dominican) concept of happiness, 
Aquinas’s ethics, and the Beatitudes. 
Another possible extension of the present work would be to examine its connections 
to Aquinas’s sacramental theology, asking questions such as: What is the role of the 
sacraments in bringing about and supporting the mode of life envisioned by Aquinas, 
in particular growing charity, peace, wisdom, and justice? 
A third extension would be to re-examine the life and work of the Bartolomé de las 
Casas in the light of the conclusions of this essay. In his biographical tome on las 
Casas, Gustavo Gutiérrez characterizes Bartolomé as a front-runner of Liberation 
Theology. Gutierrez writes that las Casas “abandoned his blindness”,239 including 
theological blindness, rooted in his position of privilege in order to preach to the 
impoverished and abused natives of Central America and advocate for them in the 
corridors of power of the Spanish empire and the Roman Catholic Church. The point 
of the re-examination would be to ask whether las Casas’s life and writings 
necessarily reflect such an abandonment or whether they are an attempt to live into 
the mode of life of charity envisioned by Aquinas, whom as a Dominican of the 16th 
century las Casas would have studied extensively. 
The question of the primacy of praxis came about due to the need for theology to 
respond to widespread poverty in the presence of exponentially growing wealth and 
global structures of power and finance in the modern world. However, much of this 
wealth is an effect of the practice of the mathematical, physical, and biological 
sciences and of the technologies and industrial revolutions based upon them. To me, 
the apparent lack of any theoria or ethics inherent in the practices of science and 
technology is the second great problem (after poverty) that the world presents to 
theology. This problem encompasses a number of challenges, for example those 
presented by: 
                                                
239 Gutiérrez, Las Casas: In Search of the Poor of Jesus Christ, p. 48. 
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• Stewardship of the ecology, 
• Response to the existence of weapons of mass destruction,  
• The pervasive effects of inside the panopticon that our electronic devices 
provide, and 
• The challenge to Christianity of scientism as a de facto religion. 
It is possible that some responses to that lack of theoria and ethics could be 
developed from the conclusions of this essay, what we have learned about Thomas’s 
view of the marketplace as a training ground for virtue, plus his writings about 
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